

## Lässt sich Glasfaser abhören?

Wie sicher ist die Datenübertragung über Glasfaser und wie kann man sich durch Verschlüsselung schützen?

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September 2013

# Why security matters




# Data Center Security Today



Need to protect information flow between data centers


# Fibre optics networks tapping possibilities



**There are multiple ways to access fiber**

# Fibre optic networks

## „optical tapping“ methods



**Cladding: 125  $\mu\text{m}$**

**Core: 9  $\mu\text{m}$**

**Lost Light**

# Fibre optic networks

## Analyzing the data



- Data analysers and test tools are commonly used by equipment manufacturers to test their product quality



- Optical power meters and spectrum analysers can help to select the right WDM wavelengths



- Data and protocol analysers allow an in-depth reading of all communication protocols used today: Ethernet, SONET/SDH, FC



- Designed for common use by the Telco industry these devices are freely available

- All data traffic can easily be monitored, recorded and replayed!

**Commercial splitter, coupler, splicing- and analysis tools are freely available at relatively low cost**

# How to protect your data in transit





# FSP 3000 Security Suite



## Physical layer monitoring

Power tracking  
Intrusion detection  
OTDR

## Encryption

AES-256  
Authentication  
Diffie-Hellman

## Security-hardened software

RADIUS  
Secure Shell  
SNMPv3

A complete and integrated solution leveraging advanced technology




# Encryption in transport systems






# Encryption Method vs Layer




- Overlay Transport Virtualization (OTV)
  - Traditionally used for VPN services
  - 82 Bytes overhead
  - Only select Bytes in header encrypted and authenticated.
- MACsec/TrustSec
  - Point-to-Point Ethernet encryption
  - 32/40 Bytes overhead, respectively
  - Only select Bytes in header encrypted and authenticated.
- Traditional Transport
  - Point-to-point and multipoint
  - Zero bytes overhead, so no loss of throughput with shorter packets.
  - Only select Bytes in header encrypted and authenticated.
- Bulk Transport Encryption
  - Point-to-point
  - Zero bytes overhead, so no loss of throughput with shorter packets.
  - Protocol/ I/F agnostic (Ethernet, FC, IB, Sonet/SDH)
  - All Bytes in header and checksum are encrypted with payload.

# Maximum Throughput a Comparison



# WDM transmission with encryption




**Modular approach, can be added per channel on an as-needed basis**

# FSP 3000 encryption overview

## 5TCE and 10TCE with encryption



### Data encryption on 5TCE and 10TCE muxponder card





- ▶ Encryption applied to the multiplexed data (support of **all** data center protocols )
- ▶ AES-256 encryption on the lowest possible layer (latency 100ns)
- ▶ Automatic key exchange every 10 mins (5TCE) every 1 min (10TCE) using Diffie-Hellman Algorithm
- ▶ Using existing FPGA core PLUS add. encryption specific HW
- ▶ Fully tested and qualified with all DC vendors (JNP, BRCD, IBM, EMC...)

# Encryption

## 10G Muxponder with Encryption



- Universal 10G Enterprise Muxponder: 5TCE-AES
- AES256 encryption
- Dynamic key exchange every 10 mins
- 5 x Any Multi-service
- GbE/10GE/FC1/2/4/8/10/Infiniband
- STM-64 network variant



# Next Gen 100G Metro



## Metro 100G with encryption



- Universal 100G Metro Muxponder
- AES256 encryption with 2048bit key
- Dynamic key exchange every 1 min
- 10GE/40GE/100GE, 4G/8G/10G/16G FC, STM-64, 5G/10G IB
- Cost breaking 100G solution for up to 500km
- Available Q1 of 2014 (R12.3)

Network DWDM CFP

10x Client SFP+





# Implementation on 5TCE



# 5TCE-AES Key Definitions



- **Authentication Key**

- Initial key that must be provided to both systems in order to authenticate them as entitled party for this communication
- Will be used to encrypt a random number that is required to calculate the final key
- Will be stored in the non-volatile memory
- If lost or otherwise destroyed no new key can be generated

- **Private Key**

- Will be generated by each party and not shared with other side
- New private key will be generated for each key exchange (no storing)
- Is required to calculate the shared secret

- **Public Key**

- Will be generated out of the private key and sent over to other side
- New public key will be calculated for each key exchange (no storing)

- **Shared secret**


- Will be calculated using public and private key as shared secret between both parties
- Will be used to generate the final session key

- **Session key**

- Will be derived from shared secret
- Is used to encrypt the data
- Has limited (programmable) lifetime of up to 42 days

# WDM Encryption

## Required components




# Standard Encryption

## Step-by-step process



### Steps to setup encryption:

- User has to provide Authentication key
- Cards will use Authentication Key for Diffie Hellman process
- Private and public key will be generated (acc. to DH)
- Public key is sent to other side encrypted with Auth. key
- Session Key will be generated out of own private and received public key (acc. to DH)
- Encrypted traffic will be transported using the session key



# FSP 3000 Security Suite



## ... for Enterprise customers

- Helps to effectively protect critical information
- Superior low-latency performance
- Enables compliance with laws and regulations

## ... for Carriers and Service Providers

- Attract new customers in key verticals
- Differentiate service offering and increase margins
- Enable new encryption service offering through separate transmission and encryption management



# Live Demo




# Starting Test Setup



- Notebook streaming Video via GbE port to other side
- GbE converter to convert from copper to fiber
- 5TCE with GbE I/F transports signal to other side
- Receiving end converts back from fiber to copper and feeds into notebook
- Video stream using UDP



# Starting Test Setup Management



- Management via browser and HTTPS
- LAN/Ethernet cable to connect to local network element
- Inband communication used to access remote network element
- ECC using overhead (not part of the 5TCE encryption but SSH encrypted)
- User can be off-site (but must use HTTPS)


# Starting Test Setup

## turn on test mode



- Connect to 5TCE via local craft interface
- Login to CRYPTO MENU
- 1<sup>st</sup> login -> change password
  - Enable test mode
- Repeat activity on remote end
- After correct setup data should be transported and video should be displayed


# Link with fiber tap



- Application of non-intrusive fiber tap
- Fiber tap is uni-directional (only receiving data)
- Tapped signal gets feeded into 3<sup>rd</sup> 5TCE (non encryption) card
- Video can now be seen on 3<sup>rd</sup> notebook (and still on 2<sup>nd</sup> notebook)
- Simulation of non-intrusive tap into fiber link

# Link with fiber tap


## Provisioning of authentication key on 5TCEs



- Log-in via craft interface to local 5TCE
- Disengage test mode (video should disappear)
- Provide authentication key to 5TCE #1 and turn on encryption
- Card now ready to start running encryption (waiting for remote side)
- Repeat activity on remote side
- After authentication key has been provided and encryption turned on cards will generate session key and traffic will be encrypted
  - Video on intruder's notebook should disappear

# Link with fiber tap

## Simulation of link failure



- Pull network cable on local 5TCE
  - Observe alarms (no more data flowing)
- Re-establish network link
  - Link should come up again
  - No session key will be generated if life time is still valid (<10 min)
  - Key exchange counter should not have changed



# Thank you

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